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Abstract - In light of the recent and growing literature which has extended the use of search and matching models even to the 
housing market, this paper introduces dynamic analysis to a simple stationary state equilibrium model. Contrary to what occurs 
in the labour market, the dynamic adjustment to equilibrium depends on the level of matching frictions present in the market. 
Precisely, if matching frictions are high, sellers bear in mind future expectations regarding total vacancies when deciding how 
many vacancies to post on the market; as a consequence, the market tensions respond quickly to any changes, immediately 
reaching the equilibrium value. Instead, with low matching frictions any dynamic adjustment path leads to equilibrium without 
the need for “forward looking” behaviour on behalf of sellers. 
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1. Introduction  
Recently, there has been much focus on formulising the 
behaviour of the housing market through the search and 
matching theoretic-models usually used for the labour market. 
The housing market is in fact a “matching market” like the 
labour market that clears not only through price but also 
through time and money that the parties spend on the market. 
Matching between buyers and sellers, i.e. the number of 
contracts traded during a given period, is not ensured by a 
“walrasian” housing market but is achieved by a costly and 
time-consuming search and matching process. In short, as in 
the labour market, matching on the housing market is a result 
of a decentralised and uncoordinated search process for 
buyers and sellers. Furthermore, the number of agents on the 
housing market affects the matching probability of other 
agents on both sides of the market (the so-called “search 
externality”). 
In labour market matching models, the analysis is usually 
limited to the equilibrium conditions of the stationary state, 
since the associated dynamics are relatively simple and 
involve a unique adjustment path to equilibrium. Precisely, 
market tightness responds instantly to any change in 
parameters or expectations and it immediately achieves its 
equilibrium value (see Pissarides, 2000). 
In light of the recent and growing literature which has 
extended the use of search and matching models even to the 
housing market, this paper introduces dynamic analysis to a 
simple stationary state equilibrium model of the housing 
market. 
The main result of this analysis is that the dynamic 
adjustment to equilibrium depends on the level of matching 
frictions present in the market. Precisely, if matching frictions 
are high, sellers bear in mind future expectations regarding 
total vacancies when deciding how many vacancies to post on 
the market; as a consequence, the dynamic adjustment to 
equilibrium is very similar to that of the labour market. 
Instead, contrary to what occurs in the labour market, with 
low matching frictions the dynamic adjustment always leads 
to equilibrium, without the need for “forward looking” 
behaviour on behalf of sellers. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: the next 
section briefly presents the related literature, while section 3 
outlines a simple macroeconomics model of the housing 
market, thus showing the main results of the dynamic 
analysis. 
2. Related Literature  
Starting from the first search model of the housing market 
(Wheaton, 1990), several papers have developed search and 
matching models to analyse the formation process of prices in 
housing markets with trading frictions. Precisely, recent 
search and matching models of the housing market (Diaz and 
Jerez, 2009; Novy-Marx, 2009; Piazzesi and Schneider, 2009; 
Genesove and Han, 2010; Leung and Zhang, 2011; Peterson, 
2012) adopt an aggregate matching function and focus on the 
role of the ratio between vacant houses/sellers and home 
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seekers/buyers (the so-called „market tightness‟) in 
determining the probability of matching between the parties. 
This is in line with the standard matching approach 
(Pissarides, 2000). 
Nevertheless, unlike the quoted studies, we closely follow 
the basic matching model à la Pissarides. Indeed, we show 
that the standard matching framework extended to the real 
estate market is able to analyse the house price formation 
process without any significant deviation from the baseline 
model adopted for the labour market. 
As far as we are aware, this paper is the first attempt to 
develop a dynamic analysis of the housing market where the 
market tightness plays a key role. 
3. A Matching Theoretic-Model of the 
Housing Market 
We adapt a standard matching framework à la Pissarides 
(2000) to the housing market analysis. Thus, search is random 
and prices are determined by Nash bargaining. Also, the 
market of reference in this model is the homeownership 
market. 
We normalise the number of households in the housing 
market to the unit, i.e. hb1  , where b is the share of 
home-seekers (buyers), i.e. households who need to change 
their home (for business reasons or family needs). Thus, the 
vacant houses on the market (v) and the home-seekers (b) are 
“input” of a matching function (m) which gives the number of 
contracts traded in each instant of time, namely  

 b,vmm . 
The matching function is expressed by the functional form 
commonly used in matching models, i.e. the Cobb-Douglas 
specification, i.e.   αα1 bvbv,mm   , where 
1α0   is the (constant) elasticity of the matching 
function with respect to the home-seekers (buyers). It follows 
that the (instantaneous) probability of a match for a 
home-seeker (buyers) is 
  α1
α1
α1
θ
b
v
b
bv,m 


 , with 
  
  0θα1
θ
/bbv,m α 

 
, where v/bθ   is a 
measure of “tightness” of the housing market; whereas, the 
(instantaneous) probability of a match for a seller with a 
vacancy is 
  α
α
α
θ
b
v
v
bv,m 


 , with 
  
  0θα
θ
/vbv,m 1α 

 
. Also, standard technical 
assumptions are assumed:  


α1
θ
α
0θ θlimθlim , 
and 0θlimθlim αθ
α1
0θ 



 . The dependence of 
the instantaneous probabilities on market tightness identifies 
the so-called search externalities. 
3.1. Home-seekers (buyers) dynamics  
In the housing market is more interesting to study the 
transition from buyer to seller rather than the dynamic in and 
out of the homelessness.1 
The evolution of home-seekers (buyers) over the course of 
time (t) is the following: 
          tbtθtb1δtb/dttdb α1      (1) 
where   tb1δ   represents the home-seekers (buyers) 
inflows, i.e. at the exogenous rate δ  other households (h) 
need to change their home; whereas,    tbtθ α1   
describes the home-seekers (buyers) outflows, i.e. the 
home-seekers (buyers) that find a home. Therefore, in steady 
state we get:2 
   0tb
  α1tθδ
δ
b


                          (2) 
we obtain that the evolution over time of b  depends 
negatively on the level of b  itself: 
 
 
   0tθδ
tb
tb α1


   
This implies a converging dynamic of b : in fact, for any 
initial value of b , the share of home-seekers (buyers) always 
converges to its equilibrium value of steady state. Instead, the 
steady state relationship of b
 
with respect to θ  is negative 
(cf. Figure 1): 
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
 
                                                          
1 The “homeless” condition in the housing market is not equivalent to the 
condition of “being unemployed” in the labour market. Indeed, the two 
conditions are very different. According to Wheaton (p. 1274, 1990): « […] 
homelessness is relatively inconsequential in the housing market, and so 
moves are like voluntary “quits” in the labour market. Furthermore, moves 
involve some spell in which the household owns two units, whereas even 
voluntary job transitions usually carry some period of unemployment. More 
important, the causes of housing mobility are usually different from those 
generating job mobility». Furthermore, the two conditions coincide only in 
some cases: in fact, many people have a job but not a house (because, for 
example, they work far from home and pay rent) and many more are 
unemployed but have a home (because, for example, they live with their 
parents while searching for a job). 
2 The time reference of the variables can be neglected when we talk about 
steady state. 
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Figure 1. Out-of-steady-state dynamics of 
homeless-buyers 
In Figure 1, for each value of θ  there is a unique steady  
state equilibrium value of b . For the points that lie 
outside of the curve 0b  , the share of home-seekers 
(buyers) tends to return to the steady state: in fact, keeping θ  
constant at θ  in figure 1, a value bb   determines an 
increase in the outflow and a decrease in the inflow from b , 
as is clear from equation (1), bringing the value of b  towards 
b . The exact opposite occurs if bb  . 
3.2. The value functions of the model 
The expected values of a house (vacant V , and occupied J ) 
and of buying a house ( H ) are given by:3 
          tVtVtJtθctrV α        (3) 
     tJtPtrJ                                (4) 
          tHtPtHxtθetrH α1         (5) 
The terms c  and e  represent, respectively, the cost flows 
sustained by sellers and buyers during the search. When a 
match takes place, the risk neutral buyer gets a linear benefit x 
from the property and pays the sale price P  to the seller. Note 
that the destruction rate of a specific buyer-seller match does 
not exist and thus the value of an occupied home is simply 
given by the selling price.4 
The endogenous variables of the model are market 
tightness ( θ ) and house price ( P ). Assuming profit 
                                                          
3 Time is continuous and individuals are risk neutral, live infinitely and 
discount the future at the exogenous interest rate r > 0.  
4 In the homeownership market, in fact, if a contract is legally binding it is no 
longer possible to return to the circumstances preceding the bill of sale, unless 
a new and distinct contractual relationship is set up. 
maximization from the supply side (   0tV  , t  ) and 
stationary equilibrium (     0tJtV   ), we get the first key 
relationship of the model: 
Pθcr
J
r
P
Jθc
α
α








            (6) 
with 0Pθ/  , 0θlim 0P  , and 
 θlimP : if the price increases, in fact, more 
vacancies will be on the market. 
3.3. Price determination 
The sale price in the stationary equilibrium is obtained by the 
so-called Nash bargaining solution usually used for 
decentralised markets (recall that   0tV  , t  ): 
    γ1γ PHxVJargmax P 
 HxγP   
where 1γ0   is the share of the bargaining power of 
sellers. Entering into a contractual agreement obviously 
implies that Hx  , θ , i.e. the price is always positive. 
Simple manipulations yield the equation for the selling price: 
 
  1α1 rγ1θr
erxγ
P
 


                
(7) 
with 0θP/  : in fact, if the market tightness increases, 
the effect of the well-known congestion externalities on the 
sellers‟ side will lower the price (see Pissarides, 2000). 
3.4. Steady state equilibrium 
Four equations describe the housing market in the steady state 
equilibrium: 
i. v/bθ   
ii. 
  α1tθδ
δ
b


  
iii.   Ptθcr α   
iv.  
  1α1 rγ1θr
erxγ
P
 

  
Given the recursive structure of the model, it is 
straightforward to solve this system of four equations in four 
unknowns. Precisely, equations (6) and (7) give the 
equilibrium values of P and θ , equation (2) gives the 
equilibrium value of b and finally the definition of tightness 
allows to obtain the steady state value of v. 
3.5. Market tightness dynamics 
As regards the differential equation for θ , the free-entry 
condition for equilibrium is valid even out of the stationary 
state, i.e.    
  αtθ
c
tJ0tV

 , t  . 
Outside the steady state J changes according to its 
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dynamic equation, i.e. equation (4). Differentiating 
   αtθctJ   with respect to time we obtain: 
     tθtθαctJ 1α    . The rule for subdividing 
surplus is also valid out of the stationary state. The selling 
price is, therefore, determined in the same way in both 
stationary equilibrium and during adjustment. Combining the 
previous results, the differential equation for θ  is finally 
obtained: 
      tJtPtrJ 
 
 
 
   tθtθαc
rγ1θr
erxγ
tθcr
1α
1α1
α 





 
     
   αcrγ1θr
tθerxγ
α
tθr
tθ
1α1
α1







   (8)                                                                                
As in the labour market, it is very clear that the steady state 
relationship of θ  does not depend (in an independent manner) 
on the evolution of seekers. Nevertheless, unlike the labour 
market, the “reaction” of θ
 
with respect to θ , i.e. the 
variation over time of θ , is a priori ambiguous: 
 
 
 tμ
α
r
tθ
tθ


   
where  
     
   21α1
α
αcrγ1θr
αcrerxγtθα-1
tμ





. 
Following Pissarides (2000), the apparent unstable 
behaviour of θ  in the case of high matching frictions can be 
explained by the “forward looking” attitude of sellers which 
base their decision to post vacant houses on the future 
expected value of θ , and then immediately post more 
vacancies if they foresee a future increase in θ , in order to 
avoid posting new ones when their opening cost will be higher 
(the higher θ , in fact, the higher the average duration of a 
filled vacancy). Hence, θ  responds immediately to changes 
in parameters or expectations and also immediately achieves 
its equilibrium value. This implies a very simple adjustment 
dynamic (see Figure 3a), namely the existence of a unique 
dynamic path (saddle-path) converging at steady state 
equilibrium (saddle-point), shown by point E5. Any other 
dynamic path, in fact, leads away from the point of stationary 
equilibrium. With low matching frictions, instead, sellers do 
not need to have a “forward looking” attitude since today‟s 
posted vacancies will be easily filled in the future. Therefore, 
in this case, any dynamic adjustment path will lead to 
                                                          
5 It is possible to formally verify the nature of an equilibrium saddlepoint by 
linearising the dynamic equations surrounding a generic steady state 
equilibrium point, i.e.  θ  ,b :



























θθ
bb
0θ
b n


 
The negative sign of the determinant of the coefficient matrix confirms the 
nature of the steady state equilibrium saddlepoint. In order to have 
equilibrium stability, the matrix trace must be negative. In fact, the 
equilibrium is a node that can be stable or unstable depending on whether the 
matrix trace is, respectively, smaller than or larger than zero (cf. Bagliano and 
Bertola, 2004). 
equilibrium (see Figure 3b), even if not immediately.  
In order to clarify the previous expression, we take the 
limits of θ . Knowing the properties of the matching 
probabilities, we get: 
 
r
tμlim 0θ


 
 
0
tθ
tθ





;
  


0
tμlimθ
 
 
0
tθ
tθ





 
Without loss of generality, it is possible to define a 
threshold value of market tightness, i.e. θθ
~
 , such that if 
θθ
~
 , then  tμ
α
r
 ; whereas if θθ
~
 , then 
 
α
r
tμ  . In short, with low matching frictions ( θθ
~
 ), 
market tightness always converges to its equilibrium value of 
steady state (cf. Figure 2a); whereas, with high matching 
frictions ( θθ
~
 ), the dynamic is different and implies that 
for the points lying above and below the curve 0θ  , the 
value of θ  tends to shift increasingly further from its steady 
state value (cf. Figure 2b). 
 
2a) housing market with low matching frictions 
 
2b) housing market with high matching frictions 
Figure 2. Out-of-steady-state dynamics of market tightness 
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3a) housing market with high matching frictions 
                 
3b) housing market with low matching frictions 
Figure 3.  Adjustment paths in market tightness and 
homeless-buyers space 
4. Conclusions 
In light of the recent and growing literature which has 
extended the use of search and matching models even to the 
housing market, this paper introduces dynamic analysis to a 
simple stationary state equilibrium model. Precisely, we 
extend the basic search – matching model, usually used for the 
labour market, to the housing market analysis. Thus, market 
tightness and house price are the key variables of the steady 
state equilibrium, whereas the evolution of home-seekers and 
market frictions define the dynamic adjustment path to 
equilibrium. 
The main result of this analysis is that the dynamic 
adjustment to equilibrium depends on the level of matching 
frictions present in the market. In fact, if matching frictions 
are high, sellers bear in mind future expectations regarding 
total vacancies when deciding how many vacancies to post on 
the market; as a consequence, the market tensions respond 
quickly to any changes, immediately reaching the equilibrium 
value. Instead, with low matching frictions any dynamic 
adjustment path leads to equilibrium without the need for 
“forward looking” behaviour on behalf of sellers. 
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